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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to shed light on the quality and performance of US fiscal forecasts. The first 
part inspects the causes of official (CBO) fiscal forecasts revisions between 1984 and 2016 that 
are due to technical, economic or policy reasons. Both individual and cumulative means of forecast 
errors are relatively close to zero, particularly in the case of expenditures. CBO averages indicate 
net average downward revenue and expenditure revisions and net average upward deficit revisions. 
Focusing on the causes of the technical component, we uncover that its revisions are quite 
unpredictable which casts doubts on inferences about fiscal policy sustainability that rely on point 
estimates. Comparing official with private-sector (Consensus) forecasts, despite the informational 
advantages CBO might have, one cannot unequivocally say that one or the other is more accurate. 
Evidence also seems to suggest that CBO forecasts are consistently heavily biased towards 
optimism while this is less the case for Consensus forecasts. Not only is the extent of information 
rigidity is more prevalent in CBO forecasts, but evidence also seems to indicate that Consensus 
forecasts dominate CBO’s in terms of information content. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the recent years, a key issue in the design of fiscal policy has been the accuracy of 
government budget forecasts, both on the revenue and expenditure side. Since budgeting is about 
the future, budget decisions regarding the allocation of resources must be based on forecasts. 
However, according to Aaron (2000) “budget forecasts are always wrong, and often they are wrong 
by a lot”. Moreover, forecasts are unlikely to become significantly more accurate in the future not 
because they are compiled by unskilled technicians (who do their work conscientiously), but 
because inaccuracy is inherent to the unscientific state of the economic science. The persistence 
of overly optimistic forecasts led to the perception that, as budget forecasts came to occupy a more 
central role in the political process, the pressure on forecasters to help policy makers avoid hard 
choices led to forecasting bias. 
The accountability of governments for the use of public funds in democracies is at the root of 
budgetary procedures and has led to the development of fiscal forecasting techniques. Such 
accountability requires a clear understanding of the impact of macroeconomic developments and 
discretionary government action on both government revenue and expenditure. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, fiscal forecasting and monitoring has always received attention from policy makers, 
monetary policy authorities, international economic organizations, financial market analysts, 
rating agencies, research institutions and the general public. 
In the academic literature, there is a wealth of papers evaluating forecast records, more often 
for the macroeconomic side of the economy than for the fiscal side and even fewer taking a 
budgetary disaggregated approach. Given the role played by both revenue and expenditure 
forecasts in budgeting processes1, almost all national fiscal policy agencies have implemented 
some kind of forecasting procedure based on either judgment, simple regressions, time series 
methods, structural macro-econometric models, or some combination of different techniques.  
                                                 
1 An overwhelming majority of the existing papers dealing with short- and medium-term fiscal projections or 
attempting to assess the effect of the cycle on the budget focus on government revenues, in particular on important 
items such as Wage Taxes, Sales Taxes or Value Added Taxes, and Social Contributions (Lawrence et al., 1998, and 
Van den Noord, 2000). However, it is not unusual to see short-term forecasting models of the spending side of the 
budget (Mandy (1989), Tridimas (1992), Pike and Savage (1998) and Giles and Hall (1998)). 
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Government targets have been criticized for being systematically biased as a result of setting 
unrealistic, politically motivated targets (Strauch et al., 2004; Moulin and Wierts, 2006).2 
Governments' fiscal policies come under particular scrutiny and deviations of actual paths of key 
fiscal variables from those initially planned may spark a great deal of debate and criticism. The 
literature on forecast performance supports the view that fiscal forecasts prepared by governments 
tend to be biased3 and inaccurate4. More importantly, assessing the causes for forecast errors is 
relevant for monitoring purposes and allow for the continuous improvement of forecasts by 
learning from past errors.5 Sizeable, systematic or biased forecast errors in certain items would 
presumably allow fiscal analysts to identify weaknesses in their forecasting procedures. Auerbach 
(1999) states that "one needs more data to get a better sense of whether the recent (budget) forecasts 
really are consistent with forecast efficiency, or whether they simply illustrate the continuation of 
a process of biased forecasting". 
    This paper revisits the issue of fiscal forecast performance using the US' Congressional Budget 
Office (henceforth, CBO) data over a long time span from 1984 until 2016. Secondly, we pay 
special attention to the causes of forecast errors by distinguishing them according to their source 
(economic, policy or technical) so as to get a better idea of the extent to which what are called 
"errors" are attributable to institutional forecasting conventions. Moreover, we look at both 
government revenue as well as government expenditure predictions separately. Finally, we 
compare official (CBO-based) fiscal forecasts to the ones emerging from the private sector 
(proxied by Consensus Economics). This last point is in line with the observation that the period 
of the "Great Moderation" between 1982 and 2007 has affected the time series properties of many 
variables and the fact that official forecasts have deteriorated considerably (relative to private 
sector ones) since the 1990s (D'Agostino and Whelan, 2008; Gamber and Smith, 2009). 
      
                                                 
2 A great deal of literature has analyzed the potential bias the political and institutional process might have on revenue 
and spending forecasts (Plesko, 1988; Feenberg et al., 1989; Auerbach, 1995 and 1996; Bruck and Stephan, 2006), 
and the nature and properties of forecast errors within national states (Gentry, 1989; Baguestani and McNown, 1992; 
Campbell and Ghysels, 1995; Auerbach, 1999; Mühleisen et al., 2005). 
3 Jonung and Larch (2006) claim that in some euro area countries biased forecasts (targets) by the governments have 
played an important role in the generation of excessive deficits in the past. 
4 For a recent cross-country study assessing the forecasting performance and accuracy of fiscal predictions using a 
plethora of techniques, see Jalles et al. (2015). 
5 Papers that have also looked at causes of forecast errors for different countries include the works by Beetsma et al., 
(2009, 2013), Merola and Perez (2013), Cimadomo (2016). 
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Our results show that between 1984 and 2016, both individual and cumulative means of 
forecast errors are relatively close to zero, particularly expenditures. Moreover, the CBO averages 
indicate net average downward revenue and expenditure revisions and net average upward deficit 
revisions, with cumulative values over the six-year revision period averaging about -1.3 and -0.3 
percent of GDP for revenue and expenditure, respectively. If policy components are excluded, we 
find evidence of hardly enormous errors. Focusing on the causes of the technical component, as a 
result of unexpected behavioral responses, we uncover that its revisions are quite unpredictable 
which, ultimately, make us suspicious of inferences about fiscal policy sustainability that rely on 
revenues’ and/or expenditures’ point estimates. We also find evidence of serial correlation for 
government revenues (less so for expenditures). We then compared official with private-sector 
(Consensus) forecasts, despite the informational advantages CBO might have, one cannot 
unequivocally say that one or the other is more accurate. CBO appears to be more accurate for 
current year predictions. However, Consensus is (weakly) preferred for year-ahead forecasts as far 
as accuracy is concerned. Moreover, evidence seems to suggest that CBO forecasts are consistently 
heavily biased towards optimism while this is less the case for Consensus forecasts. Not only is 
the extent of information rigidity is more prevalent in CBO forecasts, but evidence also seems to 
indicate that Consensus, by pooling many individual forecasts, dominate CBO forecasts in terms 
of information content. 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data underlying the 
empirical section. Section 3 evaluates CBO's fiscal forecasts’ performance. In Section 4 we 
compare CBO forecasts with Consensus Economics’ ones. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Data 
    The Congressional Budget Office produces twice each year (and, sometimes, more frequently) 
revenue and expenditure forecasts for the current and several upcoming fiscal years. One forecast 
typically occurs around the beginning of February with the presentation of the "Economic and 
Budget Outlook" by CBO. The second typically occurs in August or September, with CBO's 
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"Economic and Budget Outlook: an Update". For most of the sample period, both winter and 
summer forecasts have been for six fiscal years.6  
The reasons to focus on CBO forecasts are twofold: firstly, the methodology underlying the 
CBO is probably the one that has been consistently more stable over the last decades when 
compared with the Office of Management and Budget projections alternative. Secondly, in 
between the two sources, the CBO projections are probably the ones which have been less distant 
from true forecasts since projections from the Office of Management and Budget were regularly 
distorted by budget rules (Reischauer, 1990). 
    According to Auerbach (1994) one can find three possible reasons behind the persistence of 
deficits in the US: high "baselines", unexpected behavioral responses and additional forecast 
errors. He distinguishes between three types of errors: policy errors, economic errors and technical 
(behavioral) errors. Policy errors are due to errors on the course of fiscal policy, owing to the 
implementation of new, not yet announced by the forecast cut-off date, fiscal policy measures or 
cancellation of the previously announced measures.7 Economic errors are those that can be 
explained by wrong forecasts of macroeconomic variables that are used in the budget projections. 
Finally, technical errors would be due to other ("residual") factors, for example, a shift in the 
composition of capital income from dividends to capital gains, or a change in the distribution of 
income, or a revision in revenue resulting from a change in the rate of tax evasion. They might in 
part stem from behavioral responses but also from model mis-specification. Factors such the 
impact of macroeconomic forecast errors and data revisions have not been extensively covered. 
Exceptions include the studies by Jong-A-Pin et al. (2012) and Beetsma et al. (2013).8 These 
factors are intertwined with the forecasting procedures by a given institution, the treatment of 
assumptions and other variables, the forecast horizon, the nature of data, and the level of detail and 
                                                 
6 Recently, CBO has begun to report forecasts over an eleven-year horizon. 
7 Note that is should not be confused with “political” errors. In fact, any political economic dimension to forecast 
revisions is outside the scope of this paper. 
8 In addition, Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004) and Morris and Schuknecht (2007) point to the impact of asset price 
changes in fiscal revenues and expenditures as a source of government deficit and debt biases. 
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aggregation a forecaster might want to pursue. Next, we will attempt to address some of these 
issues. 
 
3. A look into the causes of forecast errors: Evaluating CBO Forecasts 
    In addition to the historical examination of forecasting performance, a real-time forecaster needs 
to understand the causes of the errors. In revising its revenue and expenditure forecasts for a 
particular year, each government agency incorporates changes in its own economic forecasts as 
well as estimates of the effects of policy changes. For a number of years, CBO has followed the 
practice of dividing each forecast revision into three mutually exclusive categories: policy, 
economic, and technical. More formally, we may express this revision process as: 
 ththththth repxx ,,,1,1,    (1)  
where thx ,  is the h-step-ahead forecast at date t and thp , , the ,  and thr ,  are, respectively, the policy, 
economic, and technical components of the revision in this forecast from period t-1. Because there 
are two forecasts made each year for revenues and expenditures in each of six fiscal years, there 
are twelve forecast horizons and twelve corresponding revisions for the revenues and expenditures 
of each fiscal year being predicted.9 Odd-numbered revisions are those occurring between winter 
and summer; even-numbered revisions are those occurring between summer and winter. For 
example, the revision at horizon 7 included in, say, the 1998 Midsession Review was the change 
in the forecast revenue (expenditure) for fiscal year 2001 from that given one period earlier, in 
winter 1998. 
 
3.1 Revision Patterns and Statistical Properties 
    Table 1 presents basic means for CBO forecast revisions for both revenues and expenditures, 
for the period 1993-2016. To ensure that revisions from different years comparable, each revision 
is scaled by nominal GDP and expressed in percentage terms. The mean cumulative revision is 
equal to the sum of the means at each forecast horizon; it represents an estimate of the cumulative 
                                                 
9 The last such revision, however, differs from the others, in that it reflects changes over the very brief period between 
the late summer forecast during the fiscal year itself and the September 30 end of that fiscal year. Thus, similarly to 
Auerbach (1999), in our analysis below, we take only the first eleven forecast revisions for each fiscal year, labeling 
these revisions 1 (shortest horizon, from winter to summer during the fiscal year itself) through 11 (longest horizon, 
five years earlier). 
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revision (in percent of GDP) during the period from initial to final published forecast for a given 
fiscal year's revenue or expenditure.     
 
Table 1. Average Forecast Revisions, by horizon, 1984-2016 (percent of GDP) 
 CBO Revenue CBO Expenditure CBO Deficit 
 Technical Economic Policy Total Technical Economic Policy Total Technical Economic Policy Total 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Horizon             
1 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.18 0.00 0.08 -0.13 -0.19 -0.04 0.12 -0.14 
2 -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.40 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.30 0.35 
3 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.18 0.17 0.03 -0.07 0.22 0.16 
4 -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.34 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.11 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.24 
5 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.14 0.12 0.05 -0.03 0.15 0.14 
6 -0.05 -0.16 -0.08 -0.28 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.15 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.13 
7 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.11 
8 -0.03 -0.15 -0.06 -0.23 0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.20 0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.03 
9 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.16 0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.08 
10 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 -0.17 0.02 -0.09 -0.14 -0.32 0.04 0.06 -0.15 -0.14 
11 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.11 0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.03 
Average -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.09 
Sum -0.30 -0.54 -0.48 -1.31 0.09 -0.48 0.58 -0.34 0.39 0.07 1.06 0.98 
Source: authors’ computations. 
 
  A natural consequence of the theory of optimal forecasts is that these should have no systematic 
bias (assuming the perceived costs of forecast errors being symmetric). Over a long period, then, 
the average forecast errors should not differ significantly from zero. Looking at the averages in 
Table 1, then, the most notable aspect of these individual means is that they are relatively close to 
zero, particularly in the case of expenditures. Indeed, the CBO averages indicate net average 
downward revenue and expenditure revisions and net average upward deficit revisions, with 
cumulative values over the six-year revision period averaging about -1.3 and -0.3 percent of GDP 
for revenue and expenditure, respectively. For revenues, the highest fraction (in absolute value) 
comes from the economic component, while for expenditures the policy component explains most 
of the revision.  
   It is interesting to note that revenue revisions in odd horizons are generally of higher mean than 
the revisions at even horizons. In terms of timing, this translates the fact that optimism is more 
present in the summer than in the winter (but there is no obvious reason behind the existence of 
more pessimism in the winter, at the time of the initial budget presentation). The opposite applies 
to expenditures, where optimism is more present in the winter, perhaps more in line with a pre-
conception that initial forecasts are given more attention and hence carrying greater political 
weight. Furthermore, whereas in the case of revenues (winter) as the forecast horizon shortens, the 
magnitude of revisions increases due to a much higher relative contribution from the policy 
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component, in the case of expenditures (summer) the opposite applies. This can be visualized by 
plotting both sets of revisions for revenues and expenditures in the two periods, summer and winter 
– Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Revenues', Expenditures', and Deficits' Revision by Component in Summer and 
Winter Periods, 1984-2016 
 
 
However, if one breaks the sample down into sub-periods (based on the sample's mid-
point), as is done in Table 2, it is clear that the aggregate results mask very different experiences 
during the two distinct periods. The first decade of the 21st century is marked by both a higher 
downward revision in revenues and an upward revision in expenditures with the highest share 
attributed to policy components. The Global Financial Crisis affected the relationship and relative 
magnitude of each component. Policy chances became more relevant since this direct 
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governmental tool took renewed prominence in a continuous effort to react and respond to the 
negative effects of the negative shock. One example of such policy was the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) which included, on the revenue side, both tax cuts and 
deductions. Such policy changes are at the heart of the increase in the relatively importance of this 
component when revising fiscal forecasts. Note also that revenues are typically more elastic than 
expenditures with respect to movements in GDP. Consequently, during bad times economic 
changes contribute to downward revisions in revenue forecasts. Output forecasts tend to be more 
optimistic during crisis periods and also tend to be rigid when incorporating new information. In 
fact, as shown in An, Jalles and Loungani (2018) economists do a very poor job in forecasting 
recessions correctly. These authors also show that strong booms are also missed, providing 
suggestive evidence for Nordhaus' view that behavioral factors—the reluctance to absorb either 
good or bad news—play a role in the evolution of forecasts. As output forecasts are revised 
downward, so are revenue forecasts in the same direction. 10 
 
Table 2. Average Forecast Revisions, by horizon, 1984-2000 vs. 2001-2016 (percent of GDP) 
Panel A. Forecast Periods: 1984-2000 
 CBO Revenue CBO Expenditure CBO Deficit 
 Technical Economic Policy Total Technical Economic Policy Total Technical Economic Policy Total 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Horizon             
1 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.11 -0.17 -0.01 0.02 -0.17 -0.23 -0.07 0.02 -0.28 
2 0.00 -0.09 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.16 -0.07 0.06 -0.11 -0.12 
3 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 -0.15 
4 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.16 0.04 0.05 -0.12 -0.09 
5 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.08 -0.21 
6 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.19 0.07 0.04 -0.13 -0.12 
7 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.24 
8 -0.01 -0.09 0.05 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.24 0.11 0.03 -0.19 -0.18 
9 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.15 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.25 
10 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.17 -0.40 0.03 0.05 -0.22 -0.31 
11 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.21 -0.01 -0.05 -0.19 -0.37 
Average 0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.21 
Sum 0.24 -0.22 0.68 0.58 0.19 -0.47 -0.60 -1.75 -0.05 -0.25 -1.26 -2.31 
 
Panel B. Forecast Periods:  2001-2016 
 CBO Revenue CBO Expenditure CBO Deficit 
 Technical Economic Policy Total Technical Economic Policy Total Technical Economic Policy Total 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Horizon             
1 -0.05 0.02 -0.11 -0.09 -0.19 0.00 0.13 -0.09 -0.14 -0.01 0.24 0.00 
2 -0.19 -0.09 -0.49 -0.76 -0.07 -0.06 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.69 0.83 
3 -0.05 -0.02 -0.14 -0.18 0.03 -0.02 0.37 0.35 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.52 
4 -0.15 -0.16 -0.32 -0.63 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.17 0.07 0.34 0.58 
5 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.25 0.02 -0.02 0.34 0.30 0.10 0.07 0.45 0.55 
                                                 
10 We thank an anonymous referee. 
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6 -0.09 -0.23 -0.21 -0.53 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.42 
7 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.19 0.03 -0.02 0.38 0.36 0.11 0.04 0.47 0.55 
8 -0.05 -0.22 -0.19 -0.45 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.16 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.29 
9 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.42 0.44 0.10 -0.02 0.46 0.54 
10 -0.05 -0.18 -0.05 -0.28 0.01 -0.11 -0.11 -0.21 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 
11 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.05 0.50 0.61 0.16 -0.03 0.53 0.65 
Average -0.09 -0.08 -0.16 -0.32 0.00 -0.04 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.35 0.46 
Sum -0.95 -0.92 -1.78 -3.52 -0.03 -0.46 2.12 1.49 0.92 0.46 3.90 5.01 
Source: authors’ computations. 
Note: “Technical”, “Economic” and “Policy” refer to technical, economic and policy components in associated forecast revisions. 
Refer to the main text for further details. 
 
Plotting the winter/summer revisions similarly to Figure 1, one gets Figure 2 and 3. In the 
former we can see that the period 2001-2016 is associated with much higher revisions than the 
period 1984-2001. Whereas in the first sub-period the economic component had a relatively big 
importance, in the second sub-period the policy component becomes the largest contributor to the 
revisions (particularly in the winter). In the case of expenditures, Figure 3, the second sub-period 
is equally associated with higher revisions. In this case, the policy component was more important 
contributor in winter revisions in the 1984-2000 period and in summer revisions in the 2001-2016 
period. Finally, the deficit revisions mimic more or less closely those from expenditures’ (Figure 
4).  
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Figure 2. Revenues' Revisions by Component in Summer and Winter: 1984-2000 and 2001-
2016 
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Figure 3. Expenditures' Revisions by Component in Summer and Winter: 1984-2000 and 
2001-2016 
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Figure 4. Deficits' Revision by Component in Summer and Winter: 1984-2000 and 2001-
2016 
 
    
 As mentioned in section 2, policy changes are due to laws enacted; economic changes result from 
revision the agency has made to its macroeconomic forecasts. Both are considered external factors 
that are determined prior to the finalization and presentation of budget forecasts. In contrast, only 
the technical changes arise from the budget forecasting process. The focus of this paper is on fiscal 
forecasts, hence we focus more strongly on technical changes which is the “error” component one 
does not control directly and should try to understand so as to minimize it. Given the relatively big 
role attributed to the technical component, the analysis below will pay special attention on 
technical forecast errors, for they might arise, partly, as a result of unexpected behavioral 
responses. CBO does build some behavioral responses into its forecasts; the controversy is about 
whether these predicted responses are large enough. Moreover, unlike economic forecast errors, 
technical forecast errors correspond to the residuals stemming out of the forecast process which 
are not directly related to aggregate adjustments. Understanding their causes seems as an important 
exercise. Furthermore, to the extent that deficits in more recent years have been caused by 
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inaccurate assessments, one could anticipate this to appear in technical forecast errors. In line with 
Auerbach (1995) we estimate the following equation: 
 itit
t
iiit PR  
1
 (2)  
where itR  is the technical forecast error for i=r,e corresponding to government revenue, 
government expenditure respectively, and fiscal year t; and ittP 1  is an estimate of the change in 
revenues or expenditures in year t resulting from policy changes during year t-1. Thus, equation 
(2) assumes that behavior responds to the previous year's policy changes. Table 3a presents 
regression results for the case of government revenues. Recall that these policy variables give the 
estimated effect on the current fiscal year's revenue of earlier calendar year's legislation. Since 
calendar and fiscal years overlap, we include the policy variables from both the most recent 
calendar year and the one preceding it. Table 3b replicates for the case of government expenditures. 
The stochastic terms of the estimated equations also require further consideration. Each 
observation is a forecast error over the 20-month period beginning eight months before the fiscal 
year being evaluated. Hence, successive observations overlap for an eight-month period. Given 
this, one should expect successive error terms it  to be correlated, even if the underlying 
disturbances themselves were serially uncorrelated across fiscal years. Each observation's error 
should have an MA(1) structure: 
 1 ttt   (3)     
where t  is the component of the disturbance arising during the fiscal year itself. The parameter 
 , which should be positive, is the moving-average reported in Tables 3a and 3b. 
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Table 3.a Revenue Technical Forecast Revisions by horizon, 1984-2016 
Horizon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Policy L1 1.2736** 0.3129*** -0.0073 0.1211 0.2174 0.1236* 0.1454 -0.2001 0.0727 -0.2038 0.0469 
 (0.5248) (0.0417) (0.1728) (0.0853) (0.1760) (0.0746) (0.1660) (0.1649) (0.1183) (0.1252) (0.0962) 
Policy L2 -0.6552 -0.0585 -0.0033 
-
0.1588*** 0.1202 -0.1665 0.1190 -0.0400 0.0976 -0.0250 0.0875 
 (0.9079) (0.0941) (0.2074) (0.0483) (0.1292) (0.1720) (0.0877) (0.0535) (0.0724) (0.0370) (0.0579) 
Cons 0.0350 -0.0431 -0.0137 -0.0909 -0.0038 -0.0462 -0.0156 -0.0236 -0.0271 -0.0247 -0.0291 
 (0.0642) (0.0711) (0.0721) (0.0748) (0.0496) (0.0507) (0.0462) (0.0489) (0.0466) (0.0392) (0.0465) 
MA(1) -0.0737 0.3350 0.3924 0.3167** 0.3180 0.0451 0.3089* 0.3205 0.3727* 0.4274* 0.3972* 
 (0.4385) (0.2529) (0.2957) (0.1473) (0.1943) (0.2551) (0.1870) (0.2749) (0.2025) (0.2305) (0.2196) 
No. of 
Obs. 28 28 27 27 27 26 27 25 27 24 26 
Pseudo R-
sq 0.21 0.36 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.21 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Note: OLS estimates of equations 2 and 3 – refer to the main text. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
   Table 3a provides a number of interesting results. First, the MA term, whenever statistically 
significant, is positive as one would expect. The once-lagged policy variable has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient in 3 out of 11 regressions, as one would predict if behavioral 
effects were overstated (the twice-lagged variable is seldomly statistically significant). In the case 
of expenditures (Table 3b) the once-lagged policy variable has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in only 2 out of 11 regressions. The lack of statistical significance 
throughout may reflect the level of aggregation of both total revenues and expenditures. Another 
comment worth making involves the constant term, which represent the average overprediction of 
revenues (always negative even if not statistically significant) and underprediction of expenditures 
(generally positive) that remain unexplained. Sensitivity analysis of these results does not 
substantially alter our main findings (such as omitting the second-lagged policy variable).  
 
Table 3.b Expenditure Technical Forecast Revisions by horizon, 1984-2016 
Horizon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Policy L1 -0.0147 -0.5341 0.0896 0.0115 0.1376 -0.0446 0.1824** -0.0775 0.1361* -0.1377 0.0674 
 (0.6822) (0.3322) (0.1476) (0.0962) (0.0995) (0.0730) (0.0824) (0.0698) (0.0747) (0.0858) (0.0719) 
Policy L2 -0.9504 -0.0538 -0.0469 0.0620 -0.0876 0.0163 -0.0826 0.0428 -0.0780 -0.0026 -0.0126 
 (0.8034) (0.1844) (0.1079) (0.1615) (0.1240) (0.1451) (0.0970) (0.1508) (0.0883) (0.0896) (0.0580) 
Cons -0.1114* -0.0392 0.0335 0.0237 0.0465 0.0406 0.0394 0.0481 0.0385 -0.0076 0.0381 
 (0.0612) (0.0993) (0.0604) (0.0551) (0.0878) (0.0496) (0.0471) (0.0732) (0.0467) (0.0721) (0.0367) 
MA(1) 0.2224 -0.0573 0.1630 0.3798*** 0.1874*** 0.3008*** 0.1354 0.3459*** 0.2958* 1.0000*** 0.2694** 
 (0.2472) (0.3118) (0.3528) (0.1391) (0.0539) (0.1102) (0.1041) (0.0920) (0.1738) (0.0000) (0.1365) 
No. of 
Obs. 28 28 27 27 27 26 27 25 27 24 26 
Pseudo 
R-sq 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.13 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Note: OLS estimates of equations 2 and28 – refer to the main text. Heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Can we explain technical errors? To answer this question, we begin by regressing each technical 
revision for each fiscal year on a constant term and on the lagged values of the three forecast 
revisions for the same fiscal year. Our results11 show that technical revisions are essentially 
unpredictable using this information - very low R-squares and no regressor yields an impact that 
is statistically different from zero at usual levels. Even incorporating a time trend to the 
econometric specification does not significantly increase its explanatory power. On the one hand 
it is improbable that such trend will keep up for long. On the other, conditional of having a better 
understanding on the underlying process, we should cast doubts on inferences about fiscal policy 
sustainability that rely on point estimates of revenues or expenditures. 
One possible explanation for the observed pattern of government forecast revisions is that the 
aggregate forecasts considered do not really represent statistical predictions of future revenues or 
expenditures, but rather "baseline" projections that take into account assumptions about future 
policy that are inconsistent with optimal forecasting procedures. By practice, baseline forecasts of 
policy are in some cases determined by certain mechanical rules that do not reflect expectations 
regarding future policy. Hence, many of the revisions attributed to policy changes do not represent 
"surprises," but simply the application of these rules. Therefore, if one wishes to determine the 
extent to which forecasts reflect the unbiased and efficient use of available information, it is useful 
to exclude policy revisions from the analysis. One might further divide the remaining revisions 
into their "economic" and "technical" components, making it possible (potentially) to determine 
the extent to which forecasting errors arise from underlying macroeconomic forecasts, as opposed 
to other factors. This is a useful exercise: we now focus solely on these two components together, 
represented by the sum thth re ,,   in equation (1). Table 4 repeats the calculations of Tables 1 and 
2, excluding revisions attributed to policy changes. In its first three sets of columns, the table 
presents estimates for the full sample period and well as the sub-periods considered before. We 
observe that in the case of revenue revisions the cumulative value has fallen by almost half to -
0.85 percent of GDP, whereas the expenditure cumulative value has remained more or less 
                                                 
11 For reasons of parsimony these are available from the authors upon request. 
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unchanged; that is, once policy components are removed, over the six-year revision period we find 
evidence of hardly enormous errors. 
 
Table 4. Average Economic and Technical Forecast Revisions, by horizon (percent of GDP) 
 CBO Revenue CBO Expenditure CBO Deficit 
 Full Sample 1984-2001 2001-2016 Full Sample 1984-2001 2001-2016 Full Sample 1984-2001 2001-2016 
Spec. 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 11 
Horizon          
1 0.05 0.12 -0.03 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.23 -0.30 -0.16 
2 -0.19 -0.09 -0.28 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.14 
3 0.05 0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.07 
4 -0.21 -0.12 -0.31 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.17 0.09 0.24 
5 -0.01 0.12 -0.17 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.17 
6 -0.20 -0.10 -0.32 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.18 0.11 0.25 
7 -0.01 0.08 -0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.15 
8 -0.18 -0.10 -0.26 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.15 0.13 0.18 
9 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.08 
10 -0.18 -0.13 -0.24 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 0.10 0.07 0.14 
11 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.01 -0.06 0.12 
Average -0.08 0.00 -0.17 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.13 
Sum -0.85 0.02 -1.87 -0.39 -0.28 -0.48 0.46 -0.30 1.38 
Source: authors’ computations. 
 
 
3.2 Forecast Evaluation 
    Using the individual forecast revisions underlying the means in Table 1, one can construct 
formal tests of forecast efficiency. Consider the relationship between successive forecast revisions 
for the same fiscal year, thy ,  and 1,1  thy . According to theory, if each forecast is unbiased and 
uses all information available at the time, these revisions should have a zero mean and should be 
uncorrelated. Letting ha  be the mean forecast revision for horizon i, we relate these successive 
forecasts by the equation: 
 
thhthhth
thhthhhth
yy
or
ayay
,1,1,
,11,1, )(






 (4)     
where 1 hhhh aa  and th ,  has zero mean and is serially independent.12 
The hypothesis of forecast efficiency implies that 0ha  (no bias) and 0h  (no serial 
correlation). The mean values, ha , in equation 4 have already been presented, in Table 1. Table 5 
                                                 
12 For revisions at horizon 11, there is no lagged revision, so equation (4) becomes 
ttt ay ,1111,1111,11    
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presents estimates of the coefficients h . At the bottom of each column of estimates we present 
the p-values corresponding to F-tests of two joint hypotheses related to forecast efficiency. The 
first is that all means are zero ( 0ha ); the second, is that all correlation coefficients are zero        (
0h ). The coefficients in the first two columns of the table - for government revenues -, show 
substantial serial correlation13; this is less true in the case of government expenditures 
(specifications 3 and 4). As discussed above, one might have expected some of this serial 
correlation to be due to the presence of the policy component in each forecast. However, it turns 
out that eliminating the policy components of the successive revisions actually strengthens the 
results, typically increasing the estimated serial correlation coefficients. For revenues (both total 
and economic+technical), all serial correlation coefficients are positive, and the hypothesis that all 
are zero is strongly rejected (last row). This suggests a partial adjustment mechanism, with not all 
new information immediately incorporated into forecasts. One can readily imagine institutional 
reasons for such inertia. For example, it might be perceived as costly to change a forecast and then 
rescind the change, leading to a tendency to be cautious in the incorporation of new information 
in forecasts. As far as expenditures are concerned, when economic+technical is considered we find 
stronger evidence rejecting the null of no serial correlation; (which was absent when total was 
considered in specification 3 - p-value in excess of 10 percent). Finally, throughout Table 5, the 
joint test on the  ′s suggests the absence of bias (and yet again results are strengthened in the 
economic+technical case). 
 
  
                                                 
13 The finding of serial correlation in revenue forecasts is not a new one. For example, Campbell and Ghysels (1995) 
report some evidence of serial correlation in aggregate annual OMB forecasts. 
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Table 5. Serial Correlation of Successive Forecast Revisions, by horizon, 1984-2016 
 CBO Revenue CBO Expenditure CBO Deficit 
Spec. Total Economic+Technical Total Economic+Technical Total Economic+Technical 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Horizon       
2 0.5342* 0.4825** 0.9062*** 0.9418*** 0.7773* 0.9550*** 
  (0.2709) (0.1783) (0.2891) (0.1399) (0.3961) (0.3416) 
3 0.2698*** 0.4104*** 0.2437* 0.1255 0.2896*** 0.2991*** 
  (0.0875) (0.0966) (0.1234) (0.1786) (0.0489) (0.0920) 
4 0.5796* 0.7106*** 0.1411 0.5899** 0.5417** 0.8641*** 
  (0.3049) (0.2386) (0.1647) (0.2621) (0.2275) (0.2157) 
5 0.3128** 0.3215** 0.2089 0.9014** 0.3945*** 0.5736*** 
  (0.1220) (0.1185) (0.2699) (0.3392) (0.1199) (0.1360) 
6 0.6317** 0.6561*** -0.0212 0.3713* 0.4005** 0.7478*** 
  (0.2300) (0.2050) (0.1554) (0.1964) (0.1713) (0.1175) 
7 0.3654** 0.2921** -0.0458 0.2708 0.4316*** 0.5679*** 
  (0.1502) (0.1354) (0.2523) (0.2444) (0.1524) (0.0907) 
8 0.6555*** 0.6803*** -0.0310 0.4049 0.3368* 0.7959*** 
  (0.2045) (0.1818) (0.1559) (0.3955) (0.1742) (0.1993) 
9 0.3089** 0.2652* -0.0292 0.0431 0.3349* 0.4271*** 
  (0.1448) (0.1407) (0.1984) (0.1031) (0.1715) (0.1199) 
10 0.5327** 0.6427*** 0.0082 0.0292 0.2450 0.5091*** 
  (0.2222) (0.1590) (0.1344) (0.1410) (0.1813) (0.1528) 
11 0.2969* 0.2990* 0.0449 0.0545 0.2561 0.4625*** 
  (0.1659) (0.1610) (0.1366) (0.1798) (0.1636) (0.1399) 
        
P-value (alpha=0) 0.20 0.20 0.79 0.99 0.10 0.23 
P-value (rho=0) 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
 
        In what follows, we compare CBO-based aggregate deficit forecasts with those coming from 
the private sector, proxied by Consensus Economics' predictions for the budget balance-to-GDP 
ratio. 
     
4. CBO vs. Private Sector 
Some of the differences in forecast performance identified above appear large; others appear 
small. An interesting question is: which of these comparisons shows a really significant difference 
in performance, and which show differences which are not really significant given the small 
sample size and the volatility of the target variable? To some extent this is a subjective issue. For 
instance, it can be argued by a user in government that the differences between CBO and, say, 
Consensus Economics (private) forecasters in predicting business investment are not operationally 
important, since all the errors are large, and the variable is not in any case a key policy target. On 
the other hand, small differences in forecasts of policy-sensitive variables like the budget balance 
may be of great practical importance. Fiscal policy is a major government tool to direct the 
developments in the society and, more narrowly, in the economy. However, a user of 
macroeconomic forecasts in a multinational company might have a quite different perspective, and 
give a high weight to forecasts of, for instance, investment and industrial production. Because of 
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such problems in assigning weights to variables to reflect their relative importance, we do not 
attempt to pool forecast errors across different variables in this study. However, we do conduct 
two sets of tests for the statistical significance of differences in errors for the US budget balance-
to-GDP ratio using both CBO and Consensus forecasts. 
In this section, for comparison purposes vis-a-vis the CBO deficit forecasts, we resort to 
the Consensus Economics service. Earlier studies in the literature have also pointed out the 
deficiencies of government budget forecasts. See Leal et al. (2008, p. 350) for a discussion of 
previous studies, which include Strauch et al. (2004), Moulin and Wierts (2006), Annett (2006), 
Jonung and Larch (2006), and Pina and Venes (2011). Moreover, Frankel and Schreger (2014) 
find that private sector forecasts exhibit less bias than government forecasts. Hence, it is 
recommended that government forecasts should be supplemented by private sector forecasts, 
which are presumably less subject to the political pressures that governments face.14 Each month 
since 1989, the Consensus Economics has published forecasts for major economic variables 
prepared by panels of 10-30 private sector forecasters. Below the individual forecasts for each 
variable, the service publishes their arithmetic average, the "consensus forecast" for that variable. 
Consensus forecasts are known to be hard to beat (Batchelor and Dua, 1992). 15  
 
This means that, in practice, the most promising alternative to official forecasts, such as 
the CBO, for most users of economic forecasts is not some naive model, but a consensus of private 
sector forecasts (Artis, 1996; Loungani, 2001). Since Consensus does not provide forecasts of 
neither government revenues nor government expenditures independently, we have to rely on the 
budget balance forecasts. In other words, we use the mean of the private analysts' monthly 
consensus forecasts of budget balance-to-GDP ratios for the current and next year between 
February 1993 and September 2016. From this point forward, the remainder of the analysis will 
                                                 
14 Carabotta and Clayes (2015) demonstrate that the accuracy of fiscal forecasts might be improved by combining the 
forecasts of both private and public agencies. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
15 A detailed cross-country analysis of the performance and underlying characteristics of consensus fiscal forecasts is 
provided by Loungani and Jalles (2015) for a sample of 29 countries over the period 1993-2009. 
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be carried out over the period 1993-2016 (period during which both sources of forecasts – CBO 
and Consensus – overlap). 
 
4.1 Forecast Accuracy and Test for Bias 
The standard comparative measures used in the literature (such as the Mean Forecast Error, 
Mean Absolute Error and Root Mean Squared Error) are interesting when evaluating the 
unconditional forecast performance of a given institution (Keereman 1999; McNown, 1992; Artis 
and Marcellino, 2001; Pérez, 2007). We begin by presenting some summary statistics about the 
budget balance forecast error - i.e. the difference between the outcome and the forecast. Or 
equivalently: 
𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 = 𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂     (5a) 
𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹 = 𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹      (5b) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ is the budget balance forecast error for target year t with forecast horizon h, 𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑡 is 
the actual budget balance value, and 𝐹𝑡,ℎ is the budget balance forecast. We rely on the root mean 
square (forecast) error (RMSE). Figure 5 below shows that for those months for which we have 
both CBO and Consensus forecasts, the RMSE is very similar. Hence, one cannot unequivocally 
say that one or the other is more accurate.  
 
Figure 5. RMSE: CBO vs. Consensus Forecasts of Budget Balance 
 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
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Next, we perform a standard test to assess the existence of bias in forecasts. Following 
Holden and Peel (1990) specification, we have to run the following couple of regressions: 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 = 𝑎ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 + 𝜀𝑡,ℎ      (6a) 
𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹 = 𝑎ℎ
𝐶𝐹 + 𝜇𝑡,ℎ      (6b) 
 
Under the null hypothesis that 𝑎ℎ = 0, then the underlying forecast is unbiased. If 𝑎ℎ < 0, then 
the forecast is biased toward optimism; conversely, if 𝑎ℎ > 0, the forecast is biased toward 
pessimism. Figure 6 plots the results (the coefficient estimates for 𝑎ℎ) for different forecast 
horizons for both CBO and Consensus budget balance forecasts. Evidence seems to suggest that 
CBO forecasts are consistently heavily biased towards optimism while this is less the case for 
Consensus forecasts. 
 
Figure 6. Test for Bias: CBO vs. Consensus Forecasts of Budget Balance 
 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
 
4.2. Forecast comparison: WEO vs Consensus 
To test differences in forecast accuracy, we check the null hypothesis of no difference in 
the accuracy of two competing forecasts by employing the Diebold and Mariano’s (1995) (DM) 
test. The authors proposed to base the comparison on the following statistic: 
 
𝐷𝑀ℎ = 𝑇
−1/2 ∑ 𝑑𝑡,ℎ
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝜎𝑑
→ 𝑁(0,  1)      (7) 
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where 𝑑𝑡,ℎ = 𝑔(𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂) − 𝑔(𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹) is the loss function of interest. With quadratic loss, 𝑔(𝐹𝐸) =
𝐹𝐸2; with absolute loss, 𝑔(𝐹𝐸) = |𝐹𝐸|.16 Looking at Table 6, CBO appears to be more accurate 
for current year predictions. However, Concensus is (weakly) preferred for year-ahead forecasts 
as far as accuracy is concerned. 
 
Table 6. Difference in Accuracy, by horizon 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Year Ahead Current Year 
Horizon Apr[t-1] Oct[t-1] Apr[t] Oct[t] 
Absolute (MAE) 0.21 -0.01 -0.05* -0.04* 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
More accurate   CBO CBO 
Quadratic (MSE) 1.74* 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.98) (0.13) (0.05) (0.02) 
More accurate Consensus    
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
Source: authors’ estimates. 
 
Next, to test the significance of differences in bias, we use a test developed by Ashley et 
al. (1980). The test involves running a regression between the differences in errors from two 
competing methods (in our case, CBO and Consensus), and the sums of these errors. In 
mathematical terms, this means estimating the following regression: 
 
∆𝑡,ℎ= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∙ (𝛴𝑡,ℎ − 𝛴𝑡,ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + 𝜔𝑡,ℎ     (8) 
 
where ∆𝑡,ℎ= 𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 − 𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹 and 𝛴𝑡,ℎ = 𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹 . Moreover, 𝛽1 measures the difference in 
bias while 𝛽2 measures the difference in error variance once bias is removed. Under the null 
hypothesis that 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0, then there is no difference in bias. Looking at the results in Table 7, 
for year-ahead forecasts, CBO predictions of the budget balance are statistically significantly more 
optimistic than Consensus’. However, when it comes to current-year forecasts, CBO predictions 
are not significantly different from Consensus’ ones. 
 
  
                                                 
16 An alternative to the DM test would have been to implement the small-sample-corrected version of the test proposed 
by Harvey et al. (1997). 
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Table 7. Difference in Bias, by horizon 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Year Ahead Current Year 
Horizon Apr[t-1] Oct[t-1] Apr[t] Oct[t] 
𝜷𝟏  -0.63*** -0.21** -0.07 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) 
𝜷𝟐  0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) 
Num. of Obs. 21 22 22 23 
R-Squared 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-Statistic 7.33 3.21 0.60 1.18 
P-Value 0.00 0.06 0.56 0.33 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
The F-statistics tests 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0. 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
 
4.3 Information Content 
To test differences in information content we first rely on Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2015) information rigidity approach. The authors one institution’s forecast error on a constant 
plus the difference in forecasts between two forecast horizons. More specifically, we estimate for 
CBO the following regression: 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 = 𝛽ℎ0 + 𝛽ℎ1 ∙ (𝐹𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐵𝑂 − 𝐹𝑡,ℎ+1
𝐶𝐵𝑂 ) + 𝜀𝑡,ℎ     (9a) 
 
Under the null hypothesis of 𝛽ℎ1 = 0, there is no information rigidity. Under the alternative of 
𝛽ℎ1 > 0, there is evidence of information rigidity (which is higher the larger the value of 𝛽1). 
For Consensus, an equivalent regression is estimated: 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹 = 𝛾ℎ0 + 𝛾ℎ1 ∙ (𝐹𝑡,ℎ
𝐶𝐹 − 𝐹𝑡,ℎ+1
𝐶𝐹 ) + 𝜇𝑡,ℎ     (9b) 
 
Under the null hypothesis of 𝛾ℎ1 = 0,then there is no information rigidity. Under the alternative 
of 𝛾ℎ1 > 0, there is evidence of information rigidity (which is higher the larger the value of 𝛾ℎ1). 
 Results displayed in Table 8 suggest that the extent of information rigidity is more 
prevalent in CBO forecasts. 
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Table 8. Information Rigidity, by horizon 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CBO Consensus 
 Oct[t-1]-  Apr[t] Oct[t] Oct[t-1] Apr[t] Oct[t] 
𝛽1 or 𝛾1 0.50* 0.23* 0.11** 0.53 0.52*** 0.10 
 (0.25) (0.14) (0.05) (0.52) (0.26) (0.07) 
𝛽0 or 𝛾0 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.04 
 (0.21) (0.15) (0.03) (0.29) (0.16) (0.05) 
Num. of Obs. 28 31 29 19 22 20 
R-Squared 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.41 0.10 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
Source: authors’ estimates. 
 
An alternative way to assess the differences in information content of forecasts is to 
conduct a test as proposed by Fair and Shiller (1990). This test allows us determine whether one 
forecast dominates another in terms of its information content. Suppose we want to compare two 
professional forecasts made in various years t, say tCBO  and tConsensus . Every year we could 
also make a naive forecast that the target variable took some constant value, denoted by cons. The 
Fair-Shiller test in effect asks us to consider a new forecast tCombined  made by combining the 
naive forecast with the two professional forecasts, using a simple linear weighting scheme. The 
weights are chosen so as to make the combined forecast the most accurate possible in terms of 
minimum squared error. The combined forecast has the form: 
 
   ]...[ 210 ttt ConsensuswCBOwconswCombined    (10)    
 
 where 0w , 1w , and 2w  are the weights which minimize squared differences between the outturns 
for the target variable tactual  and the tCombined  forecast. These optimal weights can be found 
by running a linear regression of the form: 
 
tttt vConsensuswCBOwcactual  2`1 .     (11)     
 
where 𝑐 = 𝑤0 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠, and tv  is the error made at time t. The significance of the coefficient c can 
be tested and this lets us assess whether there is bias in the CBO and Consensus forecasts. If they 
are unbiased, c will not be significantly different from zero. The coefficients on tCBO  and 
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tConsensus  effectively measure the relative information content of the two sets of forecasts. If 
each contains some information which is not contained in the other, the weights w₁ and w₂ will 
both be significantly positive.17 If one of the weights is not significantly different from zero we can 
say that it contains no information which is not already present in the other forecast, and so adds 
no value to the combined forecast. If one of the weights is significantly negative, it does contain 
information but of a perverse kind. A negative weight means that when that forecast is raised, the 
optimal combined forecast should be reduced, and vice versa. If one series of forecasts, say tCBO
, was ideal in the sense that it was unbiased and dominated the baseline tConsensus  forecasts, we 
would find c=0, 11 w , and 02 w  in equation (11). We get the following results (with robust 
t-ratios in parenthesis): 
 
 
)10.4(
15.1
)81.0()93.0(
23.022.0 ttt ConsensusCBOactual 


 (12)     
 
    The F-statistic for the joint hypothesis that c=0, 11 w , and 02 w  is 6.96 with an associated 
p-value close to zero. The constant term and the weight on the CBO forecasts are not statistically 
significantly different from zero. However, the weight on the Consensus forecasts is statistically 
significantly positive, suggesting that they dominate the CBO forecasts in terms of information 
content. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The first part of the paper has contributed to shed light on the causes of fiscal forecasts 
errors for the US economy using official (CBO) predictions of both government revenues and 
expenditures. We decomposed the forecast revisions of both aggregates into three error categories: 
policy, economic and technical. Our results show that between 1984 and 2016, both individual and 
cumulative means of forecast errors are relatively close to zero, particularly expenditures. 
Moreover, the CBO averages indicate net average downward revenue and expenditure revisions 
and net average upward deficit revisions, with cumulative values over the six-year revision period 
                                                 
17 This can happen even if one forecast is uniformly less accurate than the other. For example, one might be too 
volatile, but give better directional signals, and this information could be used to improve the accuracy of the combined 
forecast. 
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averaging about -1.3 and -0.3 percent of GDP for revenue and expenditure, respectively. For 
revenues, the highest fraction (in absolute value) comes from the economic component, while for 
expenditures the policy component explains most of the revision. If policy components are 
excluded, we find evidence of hardly enormous errors. Focusing on the causes of the technical 
component, as a result of unexpected behavioral responses, we uncover that its revisions are quite 
unpredictable which, ultimately, make us doubtful of inferences about fiscal policy sustainability 
that rely on point estimates of expenditures or revenues. Sub-sampling also matters with aggregate 
results masking different experiences during the 1984-2000 and 2001-2016 periods. The first 
decade of the 21st century is marked by both a higher downward revision in revenues and an 
upward revision in expenditures. We also find evidence of serial correlation for government 
revenues (less so for expenditures) and eliminating policy components of the successive revisions 
actually strengthens the results. 
    The second part of the paper assessed the overall quality of official versus private-sector fiscal 
forecasts. It has been accounted in the literature that fiscal forecasts of the leading US agency, the 
CBO, have since the 1990s generally been less accurate and less informative than the 
contemporaneous Consensus Economics forecasts, which are produced by averaging private sector 
predictions. Comparing official with private-sector (Consensus) forecasts, despite the 
informational advantages CBO might have, one cannot unequivocally say that one or the other is 
more accurate. Moreover, evidence seems to suggest that CBO forecasts are consistently heavily 
biased towards optimism while this is less the case for Consensus forecasts. Not only is the extent 
of information rigidity is more prevalent in CBO forecasts, but evidence also seems to indicate 
that Consensus, by pooling many individual forecasts, dominate CBO forecasts in terms of 
information content. 
All in all, Consensus Forecasts of budget balance-to-GDP ratio seems to show a small but 
consistent superiority over official (CBO) forecasts. In line with our findings, one can argue that 
the Consensus Economics fiscal forecasts can be regarded as the "best-practice", particularly since 
private sector forecasters publish predictions more frequently than government agencies (often in 
response to important new pieces of news) while the agencies are constrained to publish 
infrequently on a fixed timetable. Even in cases where their accuracy is similar to that of the CBO, 
the Consensus forecasts tend to be more timely. Nevertheless, we should point out to the fact that 
most forecasts are joint products, and alongside its forecasts the CBO provides commentary and 
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analysis which (arguably) add value to the work of private sector economists.  Furthermore, one 
should bear in mind that our results are based on the 24 years for which the Consensus Economics 
service has been running and this period was somewhat turbulent and it has presented some tough 
challenges to economic forecasters. 
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